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Making Sense of Decoupling Through Narration:  
The Case of Fighting Corruption in Global Business  
 
Abstract 
Previous organizational research on decoupling in the context of socio-environmental govern-
ance has suggested a trade-off between compliance and goal achievement, meaning that 
remedying the decoupling of policies and practices tends to jeopardize efforts to remedy the 
decoupling of means and ends. We expand on previous research on the trade-off between 
compliance and goal achievement by examining the spatiotemporal processes of sensemaking 
by which the meaning of compliance and achievement is negotiated among multiple actors. 
Taking a qualitative analytical approach we examine the evolution of anti-corruption policies 
at Siemens and affiliated actors, and describe how different anti-corruption narratives have 
developed over time at different locations and how they have been linked to each other. We 
explain that through narration actors develop a shared understanding of what it means to be 
compliant and successful and elaborate how the apparent tension between compliance and 
goal achievement is dissolved through story-telling. Our study contributes to decoupling re-
search by examining the ideational-communicative dynamics underlying the social de-
construction of the compliance-achievement gap. 
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Decoupling is a prominent concept in organization theory ever since the seminal contribution 
by Meyer and Rowan (1977). For a long time, scholars focused on the analysis of deviations 
between actual practices and formal policies of organizations, i.e., they explored instances of 
policy-practice decoupling (for an overview, see e.g. Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008). More 
recently, the deviation between practices and intended outcomes has caught scholarly atten-
tion and was identified as another type of decoupling, “means-ends decoupling” (Bromley & 
Powell, 2012; Wijen, 2014). Wijen (2014), for example, has theorized the existence of a 
trade-off between strict compliance with formal policies and the achievement of intended out-
comes. He suggests that policy adherence is not conducive to goal attainment but can in fact 
jeopardize organizational objectives in cases where the links between policies and outcomes, 
due to their complexity, are not well understood. 
A thorough analysis of the existence, causes, and relationships between different kinds of 
decoupling is particularly relevant in the context of globalization: In this setting, multinational 
corporations (MNCs) operate in complex institutional environments across multiple geo-
graphic spaces, are often confronted with heterogeneous demands and have to balance differ-
ent expectations with regard to the appropriate design of socio-environmental governance 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). On the one hand, MNCs are pressured 
to adopt globally practices and norms that have been institutionalized at the home country 
level. On the other hand, implementing a unified set of practices in the whole MNC network 
is difficult in the presence of conflicting demands imposed by various stakeholders and host 
country actors (Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013), because “satisfying some demands requires 
defying others” (Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 455). In this view, policy-practice decoupling is 
not only relevant in a mono-spatial context of conflicting demands within a school or hospital 
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(Meyer & Rowan, 1977) but particularly prevalent in the multi-spatial MNC context 
(Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008; Pache & Santos, 2010). 
Nonetheless, there is an increasing demand in the institutional environment of organizations 
for enforcing transparency and accountability to ensure compliance, i.e. the tight coupling of 
policy and practice (see Kostova et al., 2008; Wijen, 2014). In the context of complex and 
opaque socio-environmental governance, however, scholars have suggested that enforcing 
compliance is unlikely to yield the results formal policies intend to achieve; compliance may 
affect negatively the flexibility to cope with complex institutional demands (Greenwood, 
Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010; Scherer et al., 2013) 
thereby undermining prospects of goal achievement (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Wijen, 2014). 
In other words, the trade-off between compliance and goal achievement seems particularly 
pronounced for MNCs. 
While advancing our understanding of the challenges in socio-environmental governance, this 
stream of research has not yet sufficiently addressed the role of multiple actors, interests and 
interpretive schemes that are involved in the heterogeneous settings of global business, as 
well as the role of developments over time that may render decoupling a transitory phenome-
non. Notions of ‘compliance’ and ‘achievement’ are often highly contested; their meaning is 
not fixed but negotiated within a dynamic and non-linear process of sensemaking (Haack & 
Schoeneborn, 2015; Weick, 1995). In the context of socio-environmental governance, sense-
making results from cognitive and linguistic processes and involves the construction of a 
shared interpretation of ethically contentious issues (Basu & Palazzo, 2008; Reinecke & 
Ansari, 2015). Communication is central for actors to make sense of a practice and the under-
lying means-ends relations and to eventually accept and enact behavioral prescriptions 
(Green, 2004). Acknowledging that sensemaking happens in and through communication or 
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storytelling in particular (Boje, 1991, p. 106), here we focus on the analysis of ‘narratives’, 
i.e. recurrent practices of storytelling that include a causal interpretation of a time sequence 
involving focal actors, events, motivations, activities and outcomes. Narratives contribute to 
the process of sensemaking by embodying “a sense of what is right and wrong, appropriate or 
inappropriate” with respect to the achievement of a certain objective (Pentland, 1999, p. 712). 
Empirical analyses of decoupling phenomena hence need to be concerned with identifying 
prevalent story-telling patterns and thoroughly scrutinize how actors draw on narratives for 
making sense of the supposedly contentious relationship between compliance and achieve-
ment. 
We shall analyze narratives on compliance and goal achievement and their mutual relation-
ship and co-construction by exploring the case of the global fight against corruption. We de-
fine corruption as the “misuse of an organizational position or authority for personal gain or 
organizational (or sub-unit) gain, where misuse in turn refers to departures from accepted so-
cial norms” (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2004, p. 40). In particular, this paper focuses on anti-
corruption at the German MNC Siemens AG (Siemens) and also considers a diverse set of 
related corporate and non-corporate actors in the “issue field” of anti-corruption (Hoffman, 
1999). After recovering from a corruption scandal of unprecedented scope in 2006/07, Sie-
mens has gone through a process of radical change, with public authorities closely inspecting  
its structures and procedures (Gebhardt & Müller-Seitz, 2011). Siemens is now considered the 
benchmark in corporate anti-corruption programs and in many respects the company acts as a 
corporate pioneer in the global anti-corruption environment. Other Western MNCs such as 
Daimler AG or ABB Ltd. have also significantly increased their anti-corruption efforts after 
having faced corruption scandals in the recent past (Schembera & Scherer, 2014). Therefore, 
one can assume that formal policies – reflecting Western anti-corruption norms – and actual 
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daily practices at Western MNCs such as Siemens are likely to be closely aligned (Hartmann, 
2012; Schembera & Scherer, 2014). At the same time, however, severe corruption risks con-
tinue to persist in the host countries of MNC subsidiaries (TI, 2012). This points to difficulties 
of achieving desired goals and questions the impact of universal standards and norms in the 
global fight against corruption. 
We examine the possible tension between compliance and goal achievement in the global 
fight against corruption and particularly explore the evolution and eventual re- and de-
construction of this tension by asking: Through which narratives do actors in the anti-
corruption field make sense of the relationship between compliance and goal achievement? 
How do narratives relate to each other, and how do actors make sense of compliance and 
achievement over time and space?  
Our analysis of sensemaking among central actors in the anti-corruption field suggests that 
through narration actors develop a shared, yet space and time contingent, understanding of the 
relation between compliance and achievement allowing them to cope with complexity in the 
anti-corruption environment. Scholars recently identified the effect of the interplay of space 
and time on comprehensions of everyday life (Lefebvre, 2004) and MNC internationalization 
or resource planning (Haley & Boje, 2014; Quattrone & Hopper, 2005), and we expand on 
this research. We find that compliant MNCs and various types of non-corporate actors from 
the Western hemisphere implicitly accept practice-policy decoupling of host country actors 
for a certain period of time. Crucially, Western actors perceive the interaction of compliant 
and (transitory) noncompliant actors to be a necessary means towards achieving anti-
corruption goals in the long run. Our analysis thus shows that rather than treating compliance 
and achievement as objectively observable or specifiable, their meaning is mutually consti-
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tuted and thus subject to change, an insight that particularly applies to the alleged compliance-
achievement gap. 
Our contribution to scholarship in organization theory and business ethics is twofold. First, 
we contribute to organization theory by showing how incorporating the interaction of differ-
ent actors across space and time in a narrative perspective puts the postulated tradeoff be-
tween compliance and goal achievement (Wijen, 2014) into perspective. That is, the trade-off 
and underlying (lay) theories and assumptions themselves are a product of social construction 
(Ferraro, Pfeffer, & Sutton, 2005). Critically, narrative sensemaking centered on an apparent 
trade-off amounts to an important stepping stone to resolving this very trade-off, a process we 
term “self-negating prophecy,” i.e. a prediction or assumption that causes itself to become 
untrue. Second, our research clarifies that the mainstream notion of a universalistic approach 
of anti-corruption and indeed the CSR mainstream imperative of enforcing compliance and 
transparency is unlikely to achieve desired outcomes as the meaning of corruption and other 
unethical or illegal practices is locally embedded and negotiated over time, with unknown and 
often un-anticipated results.   
In the following, we describe the evolution, context and assumptions as well as the limitations 
of existing theoretical perspectives on decoupling. Based on this review, we craft our research 
questions before introducing our case context and methodological approach to answer these 
questions. Finally, we present the findings and discuss the contributions of our study. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Coping with institutional complexity: Theoretical perspectives on decoupling 
In the following, we identify and compare two theoretical perspectives on decoupling in pre-
vious research, which we label ‘the classic view’ and ‘the instrumental view’. Based on our 
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review of these perspectives and the empirical findings obtained in this study, we suggest 
further down a third ‘integrative view’ on decoupling expanding the two previous perspec-
tives, and provide an illustrative overview of the three perspectives. 
The classic view: Policy-practice decoupling 
The concept of decoupling has received much scholarly attention ever since the seminal con-
tribution by Meyer and Rowan (1977). These authors described decoupling as a response to 
cope with complex or even contradictory demands in an organization’s environment by creat-
ing a gap between formal policies and actual organizational practices. According to this “clas-
sic” notion of decoupling (Haack & Schoeneborn, 2015), the adoption of formal policies and 
structures in conformance with external expectations allowed organizations to maintain le-
gitimacy and social approval among its key constituents (e.g. Suchman, 1995). A main em-
pirical focus within this perspective has been to confirm the presence of decoupling, i.e. 
scholars have sought organizations whose practices do not comply with issued policies (see 
Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008, p. 85). For example, the presence of policy-practice decoupling 
has been studied in the context of affirmative action officers in US colleges and cities 
(Edelman, 1992; Edelman, Petterson, Chambliss, & Erlanger, 1991) and in a railway com-
pany in Sweden (Brunsson & Olsen, 1993). In this paper, we treat the presence of policy-
practice decoupling as synonymous to noncompliance; vice versa, we view compliance and 
policy-practice coupling as equivalents. 
A central assumption of the classic view is that organizations engaged in policy-practice de-
coupling do not face social evaluation, understood as outside monitoring and inspection 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Decoupled organizations can maintain legitimacy despite a lack of 
coordination and control due to the prevalence of “confidence and good faith” among their 
internal and external constituents (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 357). The logic of confidence 
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and good faith, in turn, is upheld through a variety of practices, including the ascription of 
great autonomy for organizational subunits to allow for avoidance and discretion (Goffman, 
2005), and the maintenance of face among individual participants (March & Simon, 1958). 
Another central assumption of the classic view is an understanding of actors as passive recipi-
ents of external constraints (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Like the exemplary works on decoupling mentioned above, many studies within the classic 
view of decoupling tend to restrict their analysis on one geographic space: they examine de-
coupling within a college, city, hospital or government agency among other (see also 
Goodrick & Salancik, 1996; Greenwood et al., 2011; Heimer, 1999; Tilcsik, 2010). Moreover, 
the classic view implies that decoupling amounts to a sustainable strategy to cope with institu-
tional complexity (in particular, see Meyer & Rowan, 1977), albeit more recently scholars 
have indicated that decoupling is often following by coupling processes and thus is merely a 
transitory phenomenon (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008, p. 88; Scott, 2007; Tilcsik, 2010). 
The instrumental view: Means-ends decoupling 
In contrast to the classic view of decoupling, which addresses a gap between policies and 
practices, the instrumental view describes decoupling as a gap between means and ends. 
Rather than investigating the issue of noncompliance this perspective focuses on the uncertain 
relationship between implemented practices and the achievement of goals envisaged by de-
velopers and implementers of these policies (Bromley & Powell, 2012; see also DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Wijen, 2014). 
There are two central reasons for the emergence of this different perspective on decoupling: 
First, scholars observed that in recent decades external pressures on organizations toward ac-
countability and transparency have intensified leading to an ‘audit society’ or ‘audit culture’ 
(Bromley & Powell, 2012; Power, 1999; Strathern, 2000). Through increasing NGO pressure 
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(Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007) and regulatory influences, organizations have been pushed 
“to align their policies and practices more closely and to conform to external evaluative crite-
ria” (Bromley & Powell, 2012, p. 484) making decoupling of policies and practices increas-
ingly difficult or even impossible (see also Kostova et al., 2008). That is, efforts of monitor-
ing and control in today’s business environment have increasingly displaced the “logic of 
confidence and good faith” theorized in the classic view of decoupling. 
Second, and simultaneous to growing demands for transparency, organizations are more and 
more expected to be responsible and take over the role of “corporate citizens” addressing 
transnational problems in spheres like the environment or labor norms (Matten & Crane, 
2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). Today, many stakeholders have growing expectations vis-à-
vis global corporations and demand that these firms help solving societal problems that may 
well extend or even be far removed from the corporate objective of producing goods and serv-
ices efficiently (Brunsson, 1989). While the transparency trend challenged central assump-
tions of the classic decoupling perspective, the growing socio-environmental expectations 
MNCs face then led to the emergence of the instrumental means-ends perspective rather than 
displacing the decoupling concept as a whole (Bromley & Powell, 2012). 
In this instrumental decoupling view, it has been suggested that especially in the complex and 
opaque context of socio-environmental governance where practices, causality, and outcomes 
are hard to understand and trace, mitigating policy-practice decoupling is unlikely to yield the 
results for which policies have been designed (Wijen, 2014). Some scholars have even sug-
gested a trade-off between substantive compliance and goal achievement arguing that “institu-
tional entrepreneurs who remedy the policy-practice decoupling may enhance the disparity 
between means and ends, and vice versa“ (Wijen, 2014, p. 302). The term ‘institutional entre-
preneurs’ thereby refers to resource- and powerful actors who create new or change existing 
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institutions (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Hardy & Maguire, 2008). This claimed 
trade-off is justified by the conclusion that the adopted policies are inappropriate. Remedying 
means-ends decoupling has then become the key research interest in this debate. 
The instrumental view further differentiates itself from the classic view by highlighting more 
centrally the role of agency, for example by referring to the concept of institutional entrepre-
neurs, thereby acknowledging the possibility of more active responses of organizational actors 
to conflicting environmental expectations. Even more, by focusing on global socio-
environmental governance and sustainability standards (Wijen, 2014), this view expands the 
mono-spatial or local focus typically applied in the classic view to a global dimension. 
Limitations in previous perspectives on decoupling 
The classic and instrumental views of decoupling significantly enrich our understanding of 
the relation between policies and practices, means and ends. However, both perspectives con-
tain limitations that may obscure a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon. 
Most notably, our literature review of existing decoupling perspectives revealed a limited 
understanding of decoupling with regard to three criteria: (1) the role of developments over 
time, (2) the role of (geographic) space, and (3) the applied epistemological stance. 
(1) Underlying the lines of reasoning in the recently emerged means-ends decoupling debate 
and especially in earlier studies within the policy-practice decoupling perspective is a static 
conceptualization of decoupling. By ‘static’ we refer to the missing analysis of social dynam-
ics in the decoupling process and the presumption that decoupling is stable and lasts for good. 
Arguing that either institutional entrepreneurs ensure substantive compliance among adopters, 
thereby compromising the achievement of intended (socio-environmental) goals, or they favor 
flexibility in compliance to warrant goal achievement, thereby risking symbolic adoption 
Wijen (2014, p. 313) evokes the impression of taking a static view on decoupling. Addressing 
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the complex nature of socio-environmental problems, Wijen (2014, p. 310) highlights that 
“institutions such as sustainability standards that are conducive to compliance prescribe and 
incentivize adherence to clear rules” may create a ‘waterbed effect’, i.e. solving one problem 
while creating another (see also Dasgupta, 2000; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). While ac-
knowledging the importance of time (Wijen, 2014, p. 313), dynamics in the relation between 
compliance and achievement have not yet been incorporated in the central line of reasoning in 
the means-ends perspective. 
(2) While the classic view originally focused on decoupling in local mono-spatial settings 
such as colleges, hospitals or government agencies, the instrumental perspective expands the 
geographic space by focusing on the global context of socio-environmental problems. Wijen 
(2014, p. 313) refers to the potential benefit of introducing context-specific ‘niche institu-
tions’, i.e. arrangements classifying in between individualized agreements and universal insti-
tutions, for reducing the compliance-achievement tradeoff. We aim to expand on this sugges-
tion by addressing whether and to what extent the relation between compliance and achieve-
ment varies dependent on a particular regional space nested within a global context. 
(3) Several more recent studies in the classic decoupling perspective (e.g. Hallett, 2010; 
Tilcsik, 2010) and central studies in the instrumental view (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Wijen, 
2014) assumed, at least implicitly, that a gap between policies and practices or means and 
ends is objectively observable, i.e. they often take an objectivist epistemological stance (see 
also Haack & Schoeneborn, 2015; Haack, Schoeneborn, & Wickert, 2012). An ‘objectivist’ 
view on decoupling emphasizes the importance of studying the nature of relationships among 
the elements constituting decoupling as a stable and permanent structure (Morgan & 
Smircich, 1980). In the instrumental means-ends perspective, the tradeoff between compli-
ance and achievement tends to presume that envisaged societal goals are rather fix and do not 
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allow for interpretability or flexibility. Examples such as categorical bans on child labor or 
FAIRTRADE insisting that small farmers join cooperatives referred to in this debate illustrate 
this postulated rigidity (Wijen, 2014). 
However, these conceptualizations of decoupling and the trade-off between compliance and 
goal achievement do not fully acknowledge the fact that in the heterogeneous settings of 
global business multiple actors, interests, and interpretive schemes are involved. In such a 
complex and multi-spatial context, notions like ‘compliance’ and ‘achievement’ may not al-
ways be uncontested. Arguments from scholars taking a social-constructionist viewpoint, 
which presumes that the social world amounts to a continuous process which is enacted 
through individuals (Morgan & Smircich, 1980), address this issue. From this point of view, 
one may expect that the meaning of compliance and achievement as well as the relationship 
between the two is no longer fixed but negotiated within a dynamic and non-linear process of 
sensemaking (see Haack & Schoeneborn, 2015; Weick, 1995). Communication is central in 
this process allowing actors to make sense of a practice and the underlying means-ends rela-
tions and to eventually accept and enact behavioral prescriptions (Green, 2004). In line with 
previous research on the communicative underpinnings of standardization (Haack et al., 
2012), we regard the analysis of narratives to be particularly useful to explore the sensemak-
ing processes of the compliance-achievement trade-off. Language, or narration, in this view is 
not literally reflecting reality but also creates and influences attitudinal and behavioral dispo-
sitions affecting actual choices (Cunliffe, Luhman, & Boje, 2004; Green, 2004; Pentland, 
1999) such as the support of and compliance to organizational policies. 
Addressing the identified limitations in previous decoupling perspectives by taking a dy-
namic, multi-spatial and social-constructionist view on decoupling based on an analysis of 
compliance and achievement narratives this study aims to explore how actors in the anti-
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corruption field make sense of the relationship between compliance and goal achievement? 
We further seek to explain how narratives relate to each other and how actors make sense of 
compliance and achievement over time and space? 
Case context: (De)coupling in the global fight against corruption 
In this study, we want to empirically analyze the challenges identified in the classic and in-
strumental views of decoupling, particularly with regard to their assumptions with respect to 
time, space and social reality. Organizational corruption in today’s globalized economy is the 
predestined setting to examine the decoupling phenomenon in all its types and occurrences 
spanning multiple heterogeneous geographic spaces and depicting significant dynamics in 
recent years. No corporate actor has undergone more severe organizational changes and 
nowadays plays a bigger role in this global anti-corruption field than Siemens, as we will out-
line in the following. 
With the process of globalization, corruption has expanded transnationally, i.e. the involved 
corrupt actors and practices span multiple states. For example, an MNC with headquarters in 
one country may supply bribes to a government official in another country. Indeed, scholars 
argue that some forms of corruption, bribery in particular, are criminalized in every country of 
the world (Hess & Dunfee, 2000, p. 613; Nichols, 2012, p. 352). However, considerable het-
erogeneity exists with regard to what counts as corruption, tolerance levels and cultural ex-
pectations across countries and regions (Quah, 2011; TI, 2012). Under these conditions it is 
difficult for MNCs to determine behavior that is acceptable both in the host and in the home 
country context. When a business firm complies with social norms that are accepted in one 
context (e.g. the host country) this may lead to the deviation from different norms and expec-
tations in another context (e.g. the home country) (Scherer et al., 2013). On the one hand anti-
corruption legislations and business conventions of Western origin expect MNCs to apply 
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globally uniform anti-corruption rules. On the other hand the cultural values and social norms 
in other parts of the world, especially in emerging economies, often demand certain forms of 
business practices that contradict with Western standards (see Salbu, 1999; TI, 2012). This 
complexity and heterogeneity in the MNC environment resulting from a combination of uni-
versal rules and locally diverging business norms appears to be tailor-made for policy-practice 
decoupling. 
However, as a result of increasing enforcement of Western transnational anti-corruption law 
(GibsonDunn, 2013), more and more Western MNCs were recently hit by a wave of corrup-
tion scandals and are now pressured to closely align their anti-corruption policies and prac-
tices (Gebhardt & Müller-Seitz, 2011; Schembera & Scherer, 2014). Between 2006 and 2008, 
German and US investigators discovered a corruption scandal at Siemens that was unprece-
dented in scale and geographic reach: “The corruption alleged in the SEC’s complaint in-
volved more than $1.4 billion in bribes to government officials in Asia, Africa, Europe, the 
Middle East, and the Americas” (Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, SEC press 
release, Dec. 15, 2008). As a response to this scandal, also the company’s efforts in setting up 
anti-corruption processes and universally applying strict anti-corruption processes worldwide 
were unprecedented (Gebhardt & Müller-Seitz, 2011; Hartmann, 2012; Schembera & Scherer, 
2014). Other Western MNCs such as Daimler, ABB, General Electric or Shell developed 
compliance programs that nowadays come close to the one at Siemens in many regards 
(Schembera & Scherer, 2014). Such MNCs (now) tend to strictly comply with the universal 
prescriptions of transnational anti-corruption laws of Western origin such as the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act (FCPA) or the UK Bribery Act (Nichols, 2012). We thus expect that the 
recent enforcement trend has made policy-practice decoupling for MNCs originating in the 
Western hemisphere increasingly difficult (see also Kostova et al., 2008).  
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Despite this potential compliance, i.e. policy-practice coupling, trend among Western MNCs 
and the ubiquity of laws condemning corruption, corruption is perceived to persist in every 
country of the world and in some regions even appears to remain the standard way of doing 
business (TI, 2012). To respond to the persistence and heterogeneity of corruption risks in its 
institutional environment and promote organizational compliance with anti-corruption rules, 
Siemens has put strong focus on ‘collective action’, i.e. “methods, activities, and alliances to 
jointly combat corruption” (Pieth, 2012b), involving peers, government and society (Zindera 
& Forstnig-Errath, 2013). Indeed, Siemens agreed on a settlement with the World Bank re-
garding allegations of systemic corruption in 2009 (World_Bank, 2009). The company com-
mitted “to pay $100 million over the next 15 years to support anti-corruption work” 
(World_Bank, 2009, p. 1). Nonetheless, it appears safe to say that Siemens’s collective action 
efforts, from the establishment of a whole collective action organizational unit to comprehen-
sive and continuous communicational efforts, go well beyond the terms of the World Bank 
agreement and aim to achieve a homogenization of organizational anti-corruption processes in 
its environment (see also Schembera & Scherer, 2014). 
In sum, although the recent trend of enforcing transnational anti-corruption law has pushed 
several MNCs to comply with globally uniform rules or even actively engage themselves in 
the fight against corruption, the general perception in society remains that corruption persists 
in global business (TI, 2012) suggesting that goals have not yet been achieved. 
METHODS 
Research design 
Studying the relation of compliance and achievement in the context of fighting corruption in 
global business from a social-constructionist standpoint is a rather novel endeavor. Conse-
quently, it appears not possible to deduce testable hypotheses from previous studies on this 
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matter. We therefore chose to pursue an inductive and dynamic research design in order to 
identify and analyze narratives on compliance and achievement. As outlined in our review of 
the decoupling perspectives, a sensemaking view on compliance and achievement appears 
promising to examine how establishing a shared understanding of compliance and achieve-
ment is a dynamic context specific and interactive process which spans multiple actors, locali-
ties and periods. We thus want to examine the role of narratives and narration in the anti-
corruption field. In particular, we seek to answer through which narratives actors in the com-
plex and heterogeneous anti-corruption field make sense of the relationship between compli-
ance and goal achievement. We further aim to shed light on the relation and development over 
space and time of these narratives. Ultimately, we may provide tentative evidence on how 
these narratives affect the compliance-achievement relationship at Siemens. 
This analysis requires engagement with different types of actors in different institutional con-
texts with regard to anti-corruption. First, with regard to actors, we identified one central cor-
porate multinational actor that has been affected and now itself affects the anti-corruption 
field – the German based MNC Siemens AG. Taking this firm as a sort of starting base for 
and red line through our analysis, we approach further corporate and non-corporate actors that 
are directly or indirectly related to Siemens. Second, with regard to institutional contexts, we 
selected two ‘extreme cases’ with respect to the phenomenon of interest (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998), one displaying very low levels of perceived corruption risks and the other very high 
levels: Western Europe on the one hand and Asia on the other (TI, 2012). 
Data collection 
Our collected data consists of two primary sources, which we will present in the following: 
(1) 42 semi-structured interviews with representatives of Siemens and various other actors in 
the anti-corruption field, and (2) documentary data such as annual reports, handbooks and 
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media coverage. In Table 1 we provide an overview of interviewees, organizational affiliation 
and interview type (face-to-face, phone) as well as sources of documents. 
Interviews. From November 2012 to April 2014, two of the authors conducted a series 
of 40 formal face-to-face and telephone interviews with central actors in the anti-corruption 
field. The range of interviewees includes representatives from different MNCs, NGOs (non-
governmental organizations), IGOs (inter-governmental organizations), government, business 
chambers and field experts from practice and academia. However, reflecting our chosen focus 
on the case of Siemens, the central corporate actor in the anti-corruption field (Gebhardt & 
Müller-Seitz, 2011; Schembera & Scherer, 2014), many of these interviews either involve 
representatives of Siemens or interviewees connected to the case of Siemens, e.g. through 
their professional role. In addition, one author conducted two informal interviews with local 
people not directly acting in the anti-corruption field, a taxi driver and a small guesthouse 
owner formerly affected by corruption in the shipping industry. 
For a first ‘grounding’, we collected interview data in low corruption risk contexts as part of a 
wider research project on fighting corruption. Having asked about the organization of corrup-
tion controls after a scandal in a first part of these interviews, we learned why and how certain 
actors have installed comprehensive compliance systems (Schembera & Scherer, 2014) and 
proceeded in the latter part of these initial interviews with questions on how these clean busi-
ness process work in high-corruption risk contexts. We thereby looked for narratives on com-
pliance and goal achievement with regard to the global fight against corruption. While this 
data mostly represented a centralized headquarters (HQ) perspective, we expanded our analy-
sis in a second round of interviews to include local perspectives from actors in high corrup-
tion-risk countries. We chose the Southeast Asian region plus China considering that many 
countries in this region exhibit not only fundamental differences in cultural values and social 
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norms compared to many Western countries, but also some of the highest corruption risks 
(Luo, 2002; TI, 2012). Furthermore, pragmatic reasons such as English (except for China) as 
a common communication language and the presence of several collective action programs in 
SE Asia (Siemens, 2013) as well as good access to experts helped us to create important in-
sights from this case. Interviews lasted between 45 to 120 minutes. They were tape-recorded 
and transcribed, except for the very few cases where the interviewee refused. For validation 
purposes, we sent all transcripts back to the interviewees, and in few cases received edits most 
of which clarified acoustical misunderstandings.  
------------------------------- Insert Table 1 about here ------------------------------- 
Documentary data. Parallel to and interconnected with the interview data collection we com-
plemented our qualitative analysis by including documentary data. Most notably, we collected 
documents relating to the organizations of the interviewed actors. This included email corre-
spondence, annual reports, corruption publications such as brochures, handbooks or guides, 
and press coverage. These documents were of particular help to follow-up on interviewee 
cues and trace developments in the anti-corruption field over time. 
Data analysis 
To make best use of the dynamic process of data collection, we chose an inductive analytical 
approach meaning that our analysis of narratives started when data collection began (Corbin 
& Strauss, 1990; Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013; Hardy & Maguire, 2010). After each 
small set of interviews, the interviewer(s) took notes and discussed emerging themes among 
the coauthors. This allowed us to adjust and fine-tune our interview guides in order to follow-
up on specific cues in a next round of interviews. Once we had a comprehensive set of inter-
views and documentary data collected, we applied a systematic process of open coding using 
qualitative analysis software NVivo to develop and validate emerging structures in our data 
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(Hardy & Maguire, 2010). Along this process of working through the various interviews and 
documents, we iteratively refined, consolidated or separated emerging codes. The coding 
structure was discussed among coauthors at various points along this process to address any 
ambiguities. 
For example, we asked informants in our interviews how they perceive corruption risks in 
different regions worldwide and whether they think that there are different local understand-
ings of corruption. Responses were mostly in accordance with well-established corruption 
perception indicators such as the corruption perception index (CPI) by Transparency Interna-
tional (TI) yet in certain instances also revealed ambiguities as to what counts as corruption. 
Further, we asked corporate respondents about the biggest challenges they face with regard to 
corruption when doing business abroad and how they deal with such challenges. Such ques-
tions triggered plenty of stories on compliance and noncompliance of actors from various 
regions of the world. Another central part of the interviews was to ask about recent develop-
ments in the fight against corruption and about goals envisioned by different actors. Answers 
typically included elements of stories on achievements and non-achievements, while re-
sponses with regard to anti-corruption goals hardly ever referred to clearly defined indicators 
but most often triggered metaphors including some kind of moving or flexible element. 
Observing such a frequent use of metaphors and anecdotes in the interview responses rein-
forced our chosen focus on the analysis of narratives. We started our systematic narrative 
analysis by identifying recurrent utterances and narrative patterns (Hardy & Maguire, 2010), 
which we structured along the geographic space and time perspective addressed in the inter-
view and documentary data. On this first, and lowest, level of analysis we aimed to identify 
codes that closely reflect the wording of our interview partners (see also Gioia et al., 2013), 
termed ‘story elements’ in our study. We added a focus classification for each of these story 
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elements, stating headquarters (HQ) if it was predominantly used with respect to the Western 
hemisphere, subsidiary (sub) if it refers mainly to the Asian (high corruption-risk) context, 
and global if it applies worldwide. Similarly, we noted if the ‘story elements’ refer to the past 
(t0), present (t1) or future (t2; tx emphasizing continuous processes). We then aggregated these 
story elements on a second level into whole ‘stories’, which themselves can be defined as 
fragmented yet recurring patterns that together constitute an overarching narrative (see Haack 
et al., 2012). Consequently, we use the term ‘narrative’ on the third and highest level of ag-
gregation. ‘Stories’ combine the wording of respondents with information gained through the 
research process, whereas ‘narratives’ are then mainly informed by the research process. This 
three-level approach of structuring our data is well in line with recent inductive qualitative 
analyses (Gioia et al., 2013) and appears best appropriate to us to balance specificity and clar-
ity. Figure 1 summarizes the 5 narratives, 9 stories and 23 story elements jointly comprising 
our data structure. 
------------------------------- Insert Figure 1 about here ------------------------------- 
FINDINGS 
We focus the presentation of our findings on sensemaking of compliance and achievement 
with regard to corruption in global business across space and time. In the following, we first 
focus on the present use of narratives across different geographic spaces before looking at 
developments of narratives over time within and across geographic spaces in a second step. 
Third and subsequent to the discourse analysis, we do include a set of prominent anti-
corruption indicators to analyze the effects of the assessed sensemaking process on recent 
anti-corruption developments. Two data displays are part of this findings section. Figure 2 
illustrates the coupling process model over time and space by distinguishing three time di-
mensions (to: past, t1: present, tx: future) and three space dimensions (West, East, Global) ac-
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cording to previous space-time conceptualizations (Bakhtin, 1986; Haley & Boje, 2014). 
Table 2 shows further supporting data to provide additional evidence for our findings. 
Making sense of the present 
With respect to making sense of the status quo of fighting corruption in global business, our 
systematic data analysis outline above revealed three central narratives: the compliance de-
spite non-achievement narrative, the noncompliance as means for achievement narrative, and 
the collective action narrative. 
Compliance despite non-achievement 
The compliance despite non-achievement narrative, applied by various actors mostly referring 
to the Western context, can be summarized as follows: 
Compliance despite non-achievement. More and more Western MNCs have now im-
plemented strict compliance programs as a result of corruption scandals and law en-
forcement in the recent past. These MNCs often have no other choice but to adhere to 
Western laws of global reach despite the fact that in many parts of the world corrup-
tion is still regarded as a common business practice. 
This narrative combines two main surface stories, i.e. fragmented yet recurring narrative pat-
terns (Haack et al., 2012), that are often used in context with each other: a substantive com-
pliance story on the one hand and a no-level-playing-field story on the other hand. The former 
story draws on three main elements: ‘complying with the rules’, ‘identifying clean business’, 
and confident voices in the sense of ‘yes we can’ (conduct clean business in dirty contexts). 
The baseline element of this story is the perceived need for MNCs originating in the Western 
hemisphere to comply with global anti-corruption rules despite the continuous heterogeneity 
of perceived corruption risks across the globe (TI, 2012), often construed as a result of having 
faced or observed numerous scandals and increasing enforcement in the recent past 
(GibsonDunn, 2013). This story element is used by different types of actors, including corpo-
rate (e.g. “The public prosecutor’s office was investigating at our premises and, as a listed 
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company at the New York Stock Exchange, of course the SEC as well. There was no choice.” 
Division and Regional Compliance Officer Siemens Switzerland) (see also Schembera & 
Scherer, 2014), and non-corporate actors (e.g. “hit by a lot of violation sanctions already, your 
controls have already matured to the point that you cannot afford any grey area in your poli-
cies.“ Programme Director ASEAN CSR Network (ACN)). As a direct consequence to this 
construed lack of alternatives to strict compliance, corporate actors state that “[o]ur intention 
is basically to identify good partners“ (Siemens ASEAN Compliance Officer), for example by 
applying due-diligence processes like the Siemens Business Partner Tool in the business part-
ner selection. Third, to make sense on why clean business is actually possible even in dirty 
contexts, we found plenty of encouraging reasoning à la ‘yes we can’ at Siemens but also at 
several other powerful MNCs. As the Finance Director of Shell Philippines Exploration puts 
it: 
“We are a known brand. So yes, you could say it’s a market power, because Shell is a 
big player and we are known not to go into any under-the-table deals. (...) So, when we 
say no, they don’t insist. And we are still able to go through with our partners.” 
The downside – i.e. latter part – of the compliance despite non-achievement narrative be-
comes evident in the no-level-playing-field story told by various actors explaining why com-
pliance not necessarily leads to achievement referring to persisting differences of corruption 
risks and conceptualizations between Western and Asian geographic contexts. It is composed, 
on the one hand, of ‘limiting the impact or responsibility of individual actors’ and the ‘persis-
tence of corrupt or intransparent business elsewhere’. These story elements reflect the argua-
bly widely diffused perception, e.g. as evident in the Corruption Perception Index (TI, 2012), 
that there is clean (or fair) business in the West and corrupt (or unfair) business in many other 
regions worldwide. Or, as the Programme Director of ACN summarizes the industry rumors 
on the challenges of Siemens: “we guys, we need to play fair, you local guys are not playing 
fair“. Thereby, actors highlight challenges of transferring Western practices to high corrup-
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tion-risk countries: “Siemens alone cannot make a change“ (Compliance Officer for ASEAN, 
Siemens) or “as far as the JVs (joint ventures) are concerned, ... we also do not have the pos-
sibility and the right to now - let’s say - force them to take over Daimler compliance tools or 
methodologies“ (Regional Compliance Office at Daimler Greater China).  
On the other hand, there are elements of the no-level-playing-field story that question the 
‘common’ distinction between clean and dirty, or fair and unfair. Actors refer to the global 
‘ambiguity of what actually counts as corruption’ for example with respect to tipping and lob-
bying in the US (interview with TI Malaysia, among others), or the role of ‘managing percep-
tions’ e.g. as to how financial hubs like Singapore – or even Switzerland – are perceived as 
clean despite the fact that funds from risk zones come in and exit (Siemens ASEAN Compli-
ance Officer). Most interestingly, actors make sense of such ambiguities as providing possi-
bilities for ‘complying with rules but violating principles’: 
“So you can work with the letter of the law, but leave out the spirit. So you can be 
100% compliant, but no system is 100% perfect. So you can deal with all the rules, 
and you can still bypass them at key points, and get what you want. And that is the dif-
ference between compliance and integrity.” (Business Integrity Programme Manager, 
TI Malaysia) 
This crucial story element combines the limits of anti-corruption law, the ambiguity in anti-
corruption definitions and the difference between compliance and integrity. It thereby synthe-
sizes not only major parts of the no-level-playing-field story but also of the overarching com-
pliance despite non-achievement narrative. 
To conclude, the compliance despite non-achievement narrative suggests that certain actors 
originating from Western Europe or the US appear to have taken a pioneering role by install-
ing a comprehensive set of compliance processes that, potentially, allow them to do business 
in a ‘clean’ way despite the persistence of considerable heterogeneity with respect to corrup-
tion levels across different geographic spaces. Interestingly, however, due to the inherent 
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definitional ambiguities and the perceived lack of a waterproof anti-corruption law – beside 
certain firm characteristics – such formally strict compliance processes do not necessarily 
result in a lack of (Western) actor flexibility. 
Noncompliance as means for achievement 
Parallel to this narrative, we find stories clustering around what we call the noncompliance as 
means for achievement narrative. While originally sponsored mostly by actors originating 
from high-corruption risk context, now actors also from the Western hemisphere tend to use 
this narrative. It interprets the context of initial anti-corruption norm adoption in high-risk 
contexts like Southeast Asia (SE Asia) and can be summarized as follows: 
Noncompliance as means for achievement. Firms originating in high-risk regions like 
SE Asia come from a very different context and are at a very different stage of devel-
opment compared to Western MNCs. Quick wins are not always possible in such a 
heterogeneous situation. Getting noncompliant actors on board first is necessary to 
gain momentum toward the achievement of global anti-corruption goals. 
While substantive compliance is increasingly perceived as the only option for Western 
MNCs, the vast majority of interviewed actors regards – a transitional phase of – non-
compliance for actors originating in high corruption-risk contexts as inevitable. Even more, 
they perceive this initial step of committed, albeit non-compliant, adopters as a promising if 
not necessary mean to gradually achieve compliance and anti-corruption goals globally. Ac-
cordingly, this narrative is captured through two main stories: acknowledging heterogeneity 
and reaching out. Concerning elements of the former, actors of different type are ‘highlight-
ing others’ particularities’ with respect to high corruption-risk regions and engage in ‘perspec-
tive-taking’. While the previous no level playing field story was restricted on identifying het-
erogeneity, actors are now also making sense of and even relativize heterogeneity. High-
lighted particularities for example refer to the country level … 
„ … the agreement was [that] there is no ranking and in a way it also makes sense, be-
cause you cannot really compare apples and oranges, you know, countries with very 
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different backgrounds, with very different level of content, very different contexts.“ 
(Regional Anti-Corruption Adviser SE Asia and Pacific, UNODC) 
… or firm level: small firm size is repeatedly used as a reason leading to repercussions like 
delays when rejecting to bribe (Finance Director, Shell Philippines). Interestingly, actors even 
express understanding for others’ particularities when taking their perspective, as done for 
example by the Regional Compliance Officer for ASEAN at Siemens: 
It’s about the person who’s not earning so much and sees now someone’s giving me 
more. What would I do? I take that. So there are so many different dimensions to it. 
Singapore government, basically, their administers are paid as much as a CEO of a 
company is paid. 
As we picture it, this acknowledging heterogeneity story about actors making sense of why 
others are different and being able to take different perspectives is crucial to understand the 
narrative’s other story on the need for reaching out. Having identified or even acknowledged 
such heterogeneity in the anti-corruption field, actors of all types (excluding a former repre-
sentative of Singapore’s anti-corruption law enforcement agency CPIB) argue for the impor-
tance of ‘getting others on board first’ in order to be able at all to ‘gaining momentum and 
conditioning people’s minds’. To let the data speak, the Regional Anti-Corruption Adviser for 
SE Asia and the Pacific at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) explains 
that “our first agenda is usually ... we get them on board, because once they do that ... then we 
have a clear framework to work with them. (...) to get them on board you need to use a system 
they are all open to“. The Secretary General of TI Malaysia gets right to the point when not-
ing that “[w]e have to go across the board. The more the merrier, my friend“. Most of the 
times, this element is directly succeeded by the other reaching out story element, arguing that 
“[o]nce they have actually ratified, they have obligations. (...) it also creates a momentum in 
countries to do it, because sometimes even the national authorities may want to do it, but they 
may not have the momentum or the support ...“ (UNODC, SE Asia and Pacific). Appealing to 
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people’s principles and values, a representative of the Integrity Initiative in the Philippines 
financed by Siemens even notes that, compared to a hard approach of fighting corruption,  
“[i]t’s the better approach actually (to) make people go back to their values, reflect on 
them, because at the end of the day that’s really what’s happening in the world – … 
you are too selfish about your own needs, you won’t think of other people. It’s all 
ethical issues. These are not legal issues.” 
Collective action 
Up to now, we identified the parallel existence of two – on first sight opposing – narratives 
both incorporating extremes within themselves: one making sense about compliance and non-
achievement, the other dealing with noncompliance and achievement. An outside observer 
ignoring the discourse among central actors may have observed contradictions between these 
two narratives. However, the process of conferring meaning to the perceived differences as 
evident in the various stories told by actors seems to resolve or at least reduce such contradic-
tions. In particular, actors from low and high corruption-risk contexts make sense of certain 
linking mechanisms between the two narratives, which taken together we identified as a col-
lective action narrative. Figure 2 illustrates the relation of the three narratives. This narrative 
focuses on the relation between actors from different geographic and institutional contexts 
and can be summarized as follows: 
Collective Action. There is so far globally a different functional understanding of cor-
ruption that has to come together. Joint efforts between different actors are necessary 
to exchange knowledge and practices and identify common grounds for areas of col-
laboration. 
Linking the two narratives above, we found the collective action narrative to be made up of 
two central story elements, educating and leveling the playing field, told mostly from actors 
with origins in the West. Concerning the first, we noted with interest that this narrative is not 
understood as a one way message falling on deaf ears; rather there are story elements on both 
‘leading by example’ and ‘willingness to learn/need for guidance’. On the side of the sender, 
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we heard Western actors in high-risk regions say that “[s]ome of these experiences and les-
sons learnt, … we also want to share with our JVs.“ (Daimler, Greater China). The Finance 
Director of Shell Philippines provides clear evidence on best practice sharing and makes 
sense of it: 
“ ... (at) the quarterly leadership forum, I gave our contractors our hotline. I told them 
‘if you think there is something you need to report, use this hotline or get in touch with 
your contract holder. … like I said earlier, be the example, because … the difference 
between an intelligent person and a wise person (is) the intelligent person learns from 
his mistakes. The wise person learns from the mistakes of others.” 
Commenting on the current situation in the Philippines, a representative of Integrity Initiative 
acknowledges that “[t]his is really unique in the Philippines. It’s the private sector trying to 
change the landscape.“ 
Various actors from high-risk contexts receive such initiatives with benevolence, stating that  
“[i]n all areas there is a learning requirement. (…) the advanced companies, we are 
counting on these guys to really help us spread the word. (...) because of Siemens, we 
were able to access a resource that’s critical in fueling our efforts, because there is no 
other mechanism working like that anywhere in the world. Even FCPA, if they get the 
fees from the penalties, it doesn’t go into the fight against corruptions.” (Integrity Ini-
tiative, Philippines) 
Even governments appear to be willing to learn from private actors, as the Regional Compli-
ance Officer for ASEAN at Siemens highlights: “he (Jericho Petilla, young new energy secre-
tary of the Philippines) says ‘we need the support from various sectors, in this case Siemens’. 
And that I believe is one form of a vision also for a government to improve.” NGOs like TI 
Malaysia express their appreciation of transferring best practices by mentioning “[o]therwise, 
we would be talking to companies: how do we fulfill compliance?”. The process of sending 
and receiving best practices is also often told in direct combination: “we’re encouraging the 
advanced companies to provide the best practices, the templates, the tools, to have the lower-
rated guys improve and reach that advanced level also” (Integrity Initiative, Philippines). 
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The collective action narrative is not limited to the educating story, but includes a leveling the 
playing field story. Whereas in the compliance despite non achievement narrative stories were 
told focusing on a lack of a level playing field, in the collective action narrative the leveling 
the playing field story focuses on the means to achieve desired ends; the framing is construc-
tive and links already to a future oriented narrative, which we will turn to in the next section. 
One crucial story falling under this narrative is the need for ‘uniting actors and their thinking’ 
which is often seen as the only option to navigate through complex waters, as pictured by the 
Secretary General of TI Malaysia: 
“in this world, we are now 173 ships, (but) nowadays, we have to be one hundred and 
seventy three cabins in a big liner. And this is where we are working together. ... 173 
countries moving around the ocean. We are really lost. (...) we can no longer become a 
ship, we are 173 cabins in one big ocean liner working together.” 
With regard to specific uniting mechanisms, actors see potential in „creating a round table 
with all integrity officers from multinationals to private sectors to government linked compa-
nies to company agencies (...) to start openly talking about topics, networking, creating basi-
cally a stakeholder concept “ (Regional Compliance Officer ASEAN, Siemens).  
Beyond the construed need of getting together, the leveling the playing field story also entails 
elements on actually ‘finding common grounds’. NGOs like Integrity Initiative in the Philip-
pines see their role to assist foreign firms dealing with corrupt governments: “this is where we 
come in. We try to expose the deal in such a way that it is a level playing field. That’s why we 
are important here.“ Our interview partner at Shell Philippines, proudly shared with the inter-
viewer the company’s successful interaction with the Philippine government: “we engaged 
the department of finance in coming up with a tax regulation saying that in order to prevent 
smuggling, ... why don’t you impose tax on all products and then if the company is able to 
prove that they re-exported it, then they get a refund on their tax.” However, finding common 
grounds is not always as straight forward as in this case involving a powerful corporate actor 
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and a willing government to close regulatory loopholes. Instead, the Leader of Collective Ac-
tion at Siemens uses the metaphor of a “flowerbed, where it is uncertain which bulbs will bear 
fruit”. 
Crucially, by including the analysis of anti-corruption documents, we found that this shared 
understanding about and educative and gradual approach to level the playing field though 
collective action only evolved over time. In earlier documentary data we found a much higher 
reference to so-called project specific ‘integrity pacts’, whose objective is to “[c]reate (a) 
level playing field ... by external monitoring of processes“ (Collective Action guide devel-
oped by the World Bank, UNGC, TI and Siemens among other, 2008). Monitoring of compli-
ance, sanctions and external auditors have been identified as central elements in collective 
action that have to come into play directly after a first start-up workshop. Having recently 
interviewed representatives from Siemens, TI and the UN and examined very recent anti-
corruption collective action publications, we can assess that now these actors refer much less 
to compliance-focused ‘integrity pacts’ and much more on commitment-oriented dynamic 
‘integrity pledges’, whose ultimate goal is to “gradually move toward self-assessment” (Col-
lective Action publication, ACN, funded by UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2014). 
------------------------------- Insert Figure 2 about here ------------------------------- 
Whereas this shift of story elements over time occurred with one overarching (collective ac-
tion) narrative, we will turn in the following section to developments and shifts of story ele-
ments across different narratives, highlighting that the interviewed actors identified time as 
the crucial element in fighting transnational corruption. In fact, without acknowledging dy-
namics over time the interviewed actors would not be able to make sense of the two extremes 
of compliance despite non-achievement on the one hand and noncompliance as means for 
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achievement on the other. We elaborate on the role of time in making sense of 
(non)compliance and (non-)achievement in the following section. 
Making sense of the future (and past) 
Progress as achievement 
Often directly succeeding actors’ narration about differences of compliance and achievement 
across multiple geographic spaces, we identified several storytelling patterns that can be 
summarized as a progress as achievement narrative. This narrative is nowadays shared by 
different types of actors from different institutional contexts. Rather than merely referring to 
changes in high corruption-risk regions it includes (positive) effects of anti-corruption devel-
opments for Western corporate actors and anti-corruption institutions thereby spanning across 
the global context of anti-corruption goal achievement: 
Progress as achievement. Progress takes time, but our efforts start bearing fruits. 
Western MNCs like Siemens helped to openly discuss corruption in public, which was 
not possible some years ago. Cases in high corruption-risk regions pop up in the media 
and people go to jail. 
Despite the fact that various actors referred to strict compliance with regard to several West-
ern actors in the compliance despite non-achievement narrative, on a global level actors do 
not seem to picture a fully compliant or corruption free world any time soon; they do not 
make sense of strict compliance as a reachable goal. Rather than referring to global anti-
corruption goal achievement in absolute terms, actors construe any type of progress in this 
global context as achievement per se. “The end-goal of the Corporate Integrity Pledge is to 
have its collaborators work together with all the signatories in taking the pledge forward …” 
(Collective Action publication, ACN). Put differently, in such a complex context involving 
corporate and sovereign non-corporate actors, the journey itself becomes the destination. 
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We detected the two stories progressing step-by-step and open-ended process as constitutive 
of this narrative. ‘Allowing for time to progress’ is a central element of the former story. Rep-
resentatives from MNCs in the headquarters and subsidiaries believe that “these [collective 
action] processes take a lot of time” (Vice President Compliance, Siemens HQ) concluding 
that “you are going to take baby steps with this topic“ (Sales Representative, Siemens Philip-
pines). Similarly, NGOs like TI Malaysia note “most of us want to see success overnight, but 
you would not get this success of fighting corruption overnight. It takes some time“. 
To support their logic of small steps, actors highlight that the seeds planted in the past are 
already ‘bearing fruit’. For example, a representative of Integrity Initiative Philippines per-
ceives that “[n]o, actually his administration is bearing fruit” when asked about a potential 
disappointment of the high hopes regarding the new Philippine president Aquino over the 
next years. The Compliance Officer for ASEAN at Siemens uses both story elements jointly 
highlighting that “[y]ou have to accept the fact that it’s going to take time to make change. 
But said that, from where it was 10 years ago to where it is [now], there is change.” Instead of 
referring to any specific performance oriented anti-corruption indicators, actors identify cer-
tain perception-based cues as signs of progress. For example, the Regional Anti-Corruption 
Adviser for SE Asia at the UNODC notes “the global discourse has changed a lot in the past 
20 years. Corruption has become an issue that is discussed globally. There is much more 
awareness about it. (...) it is still sensitive politically, but it’s not a taboo that it used to be.“ 
Similarly, although knowing that TI’s corruption index (CPI) is purely perception based, 
many actors in the anti-corruption field refer to developments of CPI rankings over time as an 
indicator for progress in the fight against corruption. Finally, actors from within the high-
corruption risk context highlight that small progresses from a Western perspective are actually 
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big when regarded from their perspective: “these changes happen in very small cycles but 
they are considered big changes.“ (Compliance Officer for ASEAN, Siemens). 
What has already implicitly shone through in the progressing step-by-step story is now ex-
plicitly outspoken in the open-ended (or even: never ending) process story. Actors regard full 
compliance on a global level as being out of reach portraying the fight against corruption as 
an ‘ongoing effort demanding constant recalibration’: 
“It means that you have to continuously do things. It’s not only about the laws you 
have to pass. You have to have systems in place. You have to have prevention systems 
in place. You have to be implementing those laws. You need to have institutions 
which are capable of implementing all these normative frameworks. They need to 
have the capacity to do that and so on. (...) And these reforms I think it’s very naïve to 
think that you can pass these laws, and you can have an anti-corruption agency and 
everything, and you solved the corruption problem.” (Regional Advisor ASEAN, 
UNODC) 
The Secretary General of TI Malaysia highlights the need for continuous recalibration when 
noting: “… the weakness is that people take advantages. Or, it is that they find more loop-
holes existing in law and regulation. So you come back to the square one.” Similarly, by using 
the flowerbed metaphor on the uncertainty of which bulbs may bear fruits, the Leader of Col-
lective Action at Siemens expresses the need to remain flexible with regards to means and 
outcomes in the fight against corruption. When looking at the global picture, actors even tend 
to relativize the presence or possibility of full compliance in the Western context: “I think it is 
very difficult in the area of anti-corruption to say that ever about any country: ... you are per-
fectly implementing“ (UNODC, ASEAN). Rounding up this open-ended process is the ele-
ment of framing goals in terms of ‘gradually raising the bar’: 
“Now, what ... [we] want to do with the ASEAN CSR Network is to create a regional 
network gradually; first with countries which are ready, but then bring all of them. 
And that has two purposes. One is to create another level of commitment among com-
panies from the region …, to bring them all on the same level with their compliance 
system, to help coordinate, help exchange. But on the other hand, I also hope that they 




This element makes sense of the goals that are underlying the leveling the playing field story 
and the collective action narrative as a whole. Rather than formulating goals as specific out-
comes such as ‘eliminating informal side payments in project bids globally by 2030’ or 
‘eradicating intransparent financing of a business partner’s children’s education by 2020’, 
goals are stated in abstract terms such as raising commitment, help coordinate and leveling 
the playing field. It thereby seems to presume the fluid nature of defining means and ends in 
the fight against corruption as told in the previous story element.  
To sum up, the phenomenon we identified in this sensemaking process in the global anti-
corruption field is that actors from both the Western and Asian context speak with confidence 
about future progresses and seem to share a common understanding on what is acceptable and 
what is not. This shared meaning is observed despite – or rather because of – the fact that all 
actors do not have a predefined set of goals in mind and all seem to share the underlying con-
viction that eradicating corruption will never be possible. 
Noncompliance 
Finally, focusing on the past context when making sense of developments over time, we iden-
tify the almost uniform use of a noncompliance narrative by all interviewed actors with re-
gard to Western MNCs in the time before having faced a recent series of scandals. Although 
actors often avoid referring directly to noncompliance in the past, through actors’ compari-
sons of the present and past, we at least indirectly identified elements of ‘insufficient anti-
corruption processes’ and ‘lacking awareness and/or wrong mindset’ in the past clustering 
around a symbolic adoption story (Schembera & Scherer, 2014). With regard to the global 
context, both story elements are generally told. In contrast, when talking about the Western 
HQ context, actors tend to attribute noncompliance as a result of the latter element. The Re-
gional Compliance Officer for ASEAN at Siemens perceives this distinction as follows: 
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So we single handedly started for example in Malaysia, it was a one man show. We 
built up a three men team. We went into trainings. We went into process improvement, 
implementation and roll-outs. And then today, it’s up to a state where it is sustainable 
business, so to speak.  
Also contrasting the present against the past and focusing on the latter story element on the 
lack of principles, a German Daimler representative now responsible for compliance in China 
remembers: “There was a huge effort to involve the entire company in formulating this new 
integrity code to make it better understandable (…). So I think it is a totally different culture, 
and you can’t compare it to the one many years ago.” 
To sum up, as illustrated in Figure 2, we found that central (non)compliance and 
(non)achievement narratives can develop and change with respect to one certain geographic 
context over time, and can coexist across multiple geographic spaces at the same time. In the 
Western hemisphere, we have clearly observed a shift from noncompliance to compliance 
despite non-achievement in line with arguments regarding the transparency trend and conse-
quences of a set of corruption scandals of Western MNCS in the recent past. This latter narra-
tive referring to the Western hemisphere currently coexists with the noncompliance as means 
for achievement narrative applicable to the SE Asian context. Both narratives appear to be of 
transitional use, as we identified them to be most often used by actors in close connection the 
progress as achievement narrative. They are linked through the collective action narrative, 
which is told by actors from both HQ and subsidiary, i.e. low and high corruption-risk, con-
texts to express the hope for dynamics over time. This future oriented focus in the sensemak-
ing processes about the fight against corruption in global business then results in a progress 
as achievement narrative. 




Interplay of narration and tangible anti-corruption developments over time 
Looking at recent developments in the anti-corruption field, there is tentative evidence that 
narratives can be related to certain material changes in the anti-corruption environment. Of 
course, anecdotal relations between narratives and material events are not a final proof of the 
constitutive nature of narration on real world outcomes, but they allow important insights into 
how communication and commitment oriented anti-corruption efforts and initiatives can 
translate into objectively observable anti-corruption developments. 
Most notably, the planting seeds and bearing fruit metaphors within the collective action and 
progress as achievement narratives seem to connect with observable outcomes. For example 
we can observe not only rising signatory numbers but also rising numbers of self-assessments 
or more advanced implementation among participants in local integrity initiatives within 
ASEAN (see e.g. integrityintiative.com). Moreover, Siemens lists examples such as the estab-
lishment of local committees in Brazil to promote the concept of ‘clean (Olympic) games’, 
the setting up of a Summer Academy/Masters in Anti-Corruption Studies or even a compli-
ance pact with several competitors in the field of energy transmission in Argentina, suggest-
ing that “[i]n several markets, the Collective Action of Siemens and its partners has now 
started to tangibly bear fruit” (Siemens Compliance System, 2013). 
Following up on interviewees’ cues, we could also empirically observe the recent replacement 
of corrupt government officials by young and untainted personnel: the Philippine president 
Benigno Aquino III. (“actually his administration is bearing fruit“, Integrity Initiative Philip-
pines), the Indonesian president Joko Widodo, as well as the new and young energy secretary 
of the Philippines Jericho Petilla are examples in this regard. Moreover, the communicative 
efforts of Shell Philippines directed to the Philippine government have led to the material out-
come of engaging the Philippine government in the enhancement of tax measures that help 
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curtail oil smuggling. Two months after our interview with the Finance Director of Shell 
Philippines, the Philippine government representative Terry Ridon, who is primarily con-
cerned with the reduction of oil smuggling explicitly “recalled a statement issued to media 
last February 2014 by Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation Country Chairman Edgar Chua“ 
(press release, House of Representatives, Republic of the Philippines, 08 June 2014). 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Previous perspectives on decoupling have significantly enriched our understanding of the 
relation between policies and practices, means and ends. This study aimed to further contrib-
ute to the decoupling debate by addressing central aspects that have not been fully incorpo-
rated in the literature and thus may obscure a more comprehensive understanding of the intri-
cate relationship between different types of decoupling. We believe we add to the decoupling 
literature in the following ways: First, we expand insights from previous decoupling views by 
focusing on a multi-spatial geographic context. Second, we contribute to the instrumental 
view and early studies of the classic view by treating decoupling as a purely dynamic phe-
nomenon. Third, applying a social-constructionist perspective, we add to previous works on 
decoupling, which suggest that policies, practices and outcomes are objectively observable 
and clearly definable. Integrating different actors and interests across multiple spaces and 
developments over time by taking a narrative approach that acknowledges both material and 
ideational dimensions of decoupling, we develop in the following an ‘integrative view’ on 
decoupling (see Table 3). 
------------------------------- Insert Table 3 about here ------------------------------- 
We thereby contribute to the current decoupling literature by showing how the tradeoff be-
tween compliance and goal achievement as postulated by Wijen (2014) can be put into per-
spective by taking a multi-spatial and dynamic narration-oriented approach. 
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The integrative view: Dynamic (de)coupling 
In our decoupling literature review, we outlined that recent developments like the transpar-
ency trend challenged central assumptions of the classic policy-practice decoupling view (e.g. 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Due to another trend, referred to as ‘rationalization of the environ-
ment’, an instrumental view on decoupling emerged (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Wijen, 2014). 
While the classic policy-practice decoupling perspective focused mainly on mono-spatial in-
stitutional complexity, the instrumental view expanded the geographic focus to the context of 
global socio-environmental governance. However, several studies within both views tend to 
neglect the social-constructionist tradition (Berger & Luckmann, 1967) that inspired the very 
first works on decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
As summarized in Table 3, our study incorporates a social-constructivist epistemological 
stance. That is, we focus on the analysis of narratives and find that the meaning of compliance 
and achievement, and the relationship between the two, is no longer fixed but negotiated 
within a dynamic and non-linear process of sensemaking (see also Haack & Schoeneborn, 
2015; Weick, 1995). Depending on the means available and valuable to involved actors, they 
may identify goals which appear worthwhile to them (Joas, 1996). Consequently, decoupling 
is described in our ‘integrative view’ as a ‘flexible understanding of compliance and 
achievement’ (see Table 3). Moreover, this view perceives actors in the anti-corruption field 
as being more interactive compared to the rather passively or actively responsive actor behav-
ior assumed in the other two decoupling views. Not only regulatory institutions, but also 
many MNCs nowadays openly share and actively promote their anti-corruption practices with 
various actors worldwide. In the Philippines, for example, we even noted that “it’s the private 
sector trying to change the landscape” (Integrity Initiative, Philippines). 
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Table 3 also depicts the central assumption of our integrative view that the ‘meaning of com-
pliance and achievement is ‘reciprocally typified’, i.e. mutually constituted among the in-
volved anti-corruption actors. In the following we outline the reasoning behind this assump-
tion by elaborating on the space and time dimensions of our integrative view. We thus further 
illustrate the pivotal role sensemaking (through narration) plays for gaining a holistic, i.e. ma-
terial and ideational spatiotemporal (Haley & Boje, 2014), understanding of compliance and 
goal achievement. 
Incorporating space: Making sense about geographic contingencies 
First addressing the space dimension, we contribute to the decoupling literature by suggesting 
that the means-ends debate should expand further beyond an objectivist either-or (i.e. either 
compliance or noncompliance) perspective (see e.g. Wijen, 2014). Rather, we propose a so-
cial-constructionist, i.e. sensemaking, both-and perspective taking into account spatial contin-
gencies of (non)compliance in relation to the achievement of global societal goals. The role of 
making sense of geographic differences through storytelling has been recently identified in 
studies on everyday life and MNC internationalization (Haley & Boje, 2014; Lefebvre, 2004). 
However, previous studies on compliance and achievement in the context of socio-
environmental governance insufficiently recognize the potential of sensemaking to create a 
shared understanding of an interaction between compliant actors and noncompliant actors. 
Instead, scholars tend to regard compliance and noncompliance in clear separation, stating 
that (1) ensuring substantive compliance compromises the achievement of intended goals, 
while (2) favoring flexibility in compliance warrants goal achievement yet risks symbolic 
adoption (Wijen, 2014, p. 313). 
Our findings as summarized in Figure 2 suggest that through narration actors in the anti-
corruption field make sense of a parallel existence and interaction (middle box at t1) of sub-
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stantively compliant actors mainly originating from a low corruption-risk space (left box at t1) 
and noncompliant actors in higher corruption-risk spaces (right box at t1) to be conducive for 
goal achievement (at tx) in complex institutional contexts. We were able to identify that actors 
develop a shared understanding about geographic contingencies requiring some actors to be 
compliant everywhere, other actors to be compliant somewhere and still others (so far) inevi-
tably to be compliant nowhere. 
In particular, Western and Asian actors make sense of uniform substantive compliance as the 
only option for MNCs originating in the Western hemisphere. Actors attribute this lack of 
choice for Western MNCs to noncompliance of these actors in the past, which led to major 
scandals and a radical rethinking (captured by the ‘complying with the rules’ story element in 
Table 2) (see also Schembera & Scherer, 2014). Having learnt their lessons the hard way, they 
now proclaim: “Only clean business is Siemens business - everywhere - everybody - every 
time...“ (Peter Löscher, formerly CEO at Siemens). In contrast, local actors are only meant to 
be compliant when dealing with Western MNCs: “So, when they work with us, they have to 
follow our principles. But when they work with others, they don’t have those standards in 
place“ (Finance Director, Shell Philippines). Importantly, our findings suggest that such a 
coexistence of different degrees of compliance is possible because actors tend to have an im-
plicitly shared understanding about what compliance or corruption means (“… in practice, we 
all may agree that China’s corruption problem is more serious than Germany’s.“ Chinese 
compliance officer at Daimler Greater China) without being able to clearly define what prac-
tices in which context actually count as noncompliant (“is it culture that they take it, …  or is 
it really not?“ General Secretary, TI Malaysia). To remedy the theorized compliance-
achievement tradeoff, previous studies suggest creating niche institutions that explicitly de-
fine the conditions of noncompliance and compliance (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010; Wijen, 
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2014; Young, 2012). In contrast, considering the apparent implicit understanding about who, 
where, when and why needs to comply as paraphrased in the quotes above, we suggest that 
such explicit context-specific definitions are hardly feasible on objectivist grounds. 
Our findings suggest that without the presence of globally uniform rules and substantive 
compliers acting as institutional entrepreneurs in the first place, non- or partially complying 
actors would lack the guidance and willingness to become compliant. As one interviewee put 
it: “Otherwise, we would be talking to companies: How do we fulfill compliance?” This in-
teraction between compliant and noncompliant actors appears thus as a necessary means to 
ultimately achieve global anti-corruption goals, which we capture in the narrative ‘noncom-
pliance as means for achievement’ (see Table 3 for further evidence). Not without a reason, 
the Integrity Initiative in the Philippines has chosen the name SHINE project for their anti-
corruption efforts. The interview partner explained that the project is meant to use institu-
tional entrepreneurs like Siemens to ‘shine’ on other potentially less compliant or transparent 
actors. This metaphor is used by both compliant corporate actors and non-corporate actors and 
shows us how these actors make sense of remedying the compliance barriers in opaque fields 
as identified in the means-ends decoupling debate: lacking attention, lacking knowledge and 
lacking motivation (Wijen, 2014, p. 306). Through public events, compliance clauses in con-
tracts with suppliers or collective actions, compliant actors like Siemens reduce behavioral 
invisibility. They thereby remedy a further compliance barrier and driver of opacity in com-
plex global environments (Jiang & Bansal, 2003; O’Rourke, 2007; Spar & La Mure, 2003).  
The coexistence of different degrees of compliance suggested here further contributes to the 
selective coupling literature within the policy-practice decoupling perspective (Pache & 
Santos, 2013). While these scholars have addressed the coexistence of selective coupling (de-
coupling and compromising) within one ‘hybrid’ organization, we extend the level of analysis 
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by examining the coexistence of selective coupling across geographic spaces. Finally, our 
contribution to perceive compliance and (transitional) noncompliance as complementary in-
stead of exclusionary approaches further supports findings from other issue areas, including 
labor conditions in global supply chains. Authors in this field similarly highlight the benefits 
of joint problem solving, information exchange and best practice diffusion among actors at 
different stages of compliance implementation (Locke, Amengual, & Mangla, 2009). 
Incorporating time: Ideational dynamics in global goal achievement 
We further contribute to the decoupling literature by stressing that a shared space-contingent 
understanding about compliance and noncompliance can only be maintained as long as actors 
perceive progress toward goal achievement over time. The means-ends debate (Bromley & 
Powell, 2012; Wijen, 2014), earlier studies within the policy-practice debate (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977) and several studies on sustainability standardization in general (Baron & Lyon, 
2012; Campbell, 2007; King, Prado, & Rivera, 2012) take a predominantly static perspective 
on social reality. These studies thus neglect the powerful influence of ‘ideational dynamics’ 
on behavioral change and tangible outcomes scholars recently highlighted (Christensen, 
Morsing, & Thyssen, 2013; Haack et al., 2012; Tilcsik, 2010). ‘Ideational dynamics’ refers to 
a recently theorized process, according to which language may eventually become performa-
tive of certain ‘positive’ developments in the field of CSR and beyond (Christensen et al., 
2013). The underlying mechanism of this process is referred to as ‘aspirational talk’, i.e. an 
organization’s publicly expressed commitment to reduce the gap between formal structures 
and actual activities. More precisely, a process of ‘moral entrapment’ and ‘creeping commit-
ment’ may take place after organizations have publicly committed to moral values; such or-
ganizations may soon start to realize that they can actually be taken to task if they do not fol-
low-up on their promises and seek to avoid losing their legitimacy (Haack et al., 2012). In 
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accordance with the psychological quest to avoid ‘cognitive’ and ‘emotional dissonance’, 
organizational actors adjust self-perceptions and interpretations of CSR to the “attitudes first 
taken by significant others toward it” (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 132). 
Incorporating such dynamics in sensemaking processes has proven fruitful in previous stud-
ies; for example, analyzing the context of MNC internationalization, Haley and Boje (2014, p. 
1128) noted precisely that “metaphors unravel when faced with paradox”. Similarly, the 
analysis of narratives in our study turned out to be crucial for putting the postulated tradeoff 
in the debate about compliance and achievement in a more comprehensive perspective. Static 
objectivist perspectives on compliance and goal achievement conclude that socio-
environmental governance schemes such as sustainability standards need to focus on compli-
ance (right away), as otherwise goals cannot be achieved due to symbolic adoption by firms 
(Wijen, 2014, p. 306) (see also Baron & Lyon, 2012; Campbell, 2007; King et al., 2012). 
Taking a dynamic social-constructionist perspective in our analysis revealed that anti-
corruption actors of different type and geographical origin care less about how, i.e. in what 
state of compliance or noncompliance, actors ‘get on board’, but much more on the fact that 
they get on board at all. Only then these actors perceive the opportunity for a joint navigation 
toward reciprocally typified goals. The focus is consequently much more on the journey than 
on the status quo or ultimate destination. That is, potential tradeoffs in the current state be-
come negligible, if perceived as such at all, when actors focus on a progressive discursively 
typified understanding of compliance and goal achievement. Different types of actors used 
metaphors like flowerbeds, planted seeds or a jointly navigated big ocean liner, which help 
them understand that the collective end of fighting corruption is a moving target and organiza-
tional means for fighting corruption may only materialize along this process, which in turn 
will lead to a reinterpretation of the collective end. We thereby expand insights from studies 
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on the MNC internationalization processes, wherein the coexistence of contradictory stories 
spanning time and space have been identified (Haley & Boje, 2014), to the context of compli-
ance and achievement in global socio-environmental governance. 
It is to note, however, that we do not perceive the interviewed actors as being overly optimis-
tic or simply naïve. We provided first anecdotal evidence that the metaphors used by actors 
are in some way reflected in observable and material anti-corruption outcomes. Positive par-
ticipant statistics over time in local integrity initiatives financed or inspired by Siemens, per-
sonnel exchange in key government positions or Shell’s success in enhancing tax measures in 
the Philippines are a first small set of exemplary material developments. So indeed, we sug-
gest that the logic of confidence and good faith, which Meyer and Rowan (1977) have con-
ceptualized as a necessary complement to policy-practice decoupling to secure organizational 
legitimacy, has shifted to means-ends decoupling. However, we should also be wary of the 
potential negative consequences in case actors no longer are able to identify certain cues of 
material developments which would render the confidence and good faith logic together with 
related ideational dynamics obsolete. 
Synthesis. In sum, the integrative view on decoupling combines elements of both the 
classic and the instrumental view, most notably dynamic considerations in recent literature on 
the former and the global (multi-spatial) perspective of the latter, and highlights the role of 
narration and meaning creation in this global (de)coupling context. Our results from the 
analysis of narratives in the anti-corruption field therefore suggest understanding gaps be-
tween compliance and achievement, and between policies and practices, as moving targets 
that are subject to sensemaking processes and meaning negotiation. We highlighted how ac-
tors make sense about compliance and achievement through narration, e.g. by using stories 
and metaphors of collectively navigating a big ocean liner or planting seeds and referring to 
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particular historical and/or geographic contingencies. Haack and Schoeneborn (2015) have 
recently suggested to include ideational dynamics in the means-ends conceptualization of 
Wijen (2014) and suggested that “[i]t is ultimately by “means” of policy-practice decoupling 
that the “end” of “effective” socio-environmental governance can be achieved.” Our dual fo-
cus on sensemaking across time and space taken here has helped us to further add to this de-
bate: In our integrative view, it is ultimately by ‘means’ of interaction between policy-
practice coupling and policy-practice decoupling that ‘effective’ socio-environmental gov-
ernance can be achieved. 
Implications for fighting organizational corruption and CSR 
Our third contribution is of relevance to scholars and practitioners in the field of anti-
corruption and CSR alike. On the one hand, we contribute to anti-corruption literature that 
focused on an objectivist perspective on the phenomenon. Given the collective nature of the 
corruption problem involving public and private actors with heterogeneous and sometimes 
contradictory interests (Kingston, 2008; Pieth, 2012a), previous corruption literature has also 
focused on collective action as a means to curbing corruption (Petkoski, Warren, & Laufer, 
2009; Pieth, 2012a). While these studies were mostly restricted to an objectivist perspective 
on corruption treating the issue predominantly as a rational choice problem (see also Ostrom, 
1998), we contribute to theorizing on collective action by highlighting the role of creating a 
flexible and discursively typified meaning of corruption and compliance through the discur-
sive elements of collective actions. Signing a letter of joint commitment may be perceived as 
a mere rational choice of a specific actor aiming to maximize its business opportunities in the 
first place, while the ideational dynamics potentially succeeding such a signature having laid a 
first common basis for talking to each other have been neglected in this literature. 
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On the other hand, our study contributes to recent narration-oriented (social-constructionist) 
anti-corruption studies. By demonstrating that the meaning of corruption may vary with re-
spect to the geographic context, our findings support the findings of Gephart (2014) suggest-
ing a contested meaning of anti-corruption and further contribute to this literature by outlining 
how the construction of anti-corruption meaning may develop over time. By clarifying that 
the mainstream notion of a universal approach of anti-corruption is unlikely to achieve de-
sired goals, our research is in line with recent analyses of narratives on the construction of 
success in anti-corruption activity in Georgia (Di Puppo, 2014). We further contribute to the 
identified search for a mutual validation of different understandings of success by showing 
that the creation of a mutual understanding of anti-corruption goal achievements is shaped by 
considerations of both space and time (see Figure 2). 
Like corruption, CSR in general seems to be a moving and contested concept (Lockett, Moon, 
& Visser, 2006; Okoye, 2009), whose ideals, standards and targets are continuously shaped 
through discourse and interactions among legislators, corporations and other actors in the 
field (Gilbert, Rasche, & Waddock, 2011; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). Accordingly, our find-
ings suggest that the central arguments in the recent CSR literature on ideational dynamics are 
also applicable to the specific issue of fighting corruption. The mechanisms of ‘aspirational 
talk’ with regard to CSR in general (Christensen et al., 2013) and those of ‘moral entrapment’ 
and ‘creeping commitment’ as identified in the context of environmental CSR issues (Haack 
et al., 2012) also appear valid in the specific context of fighting corruption. 
Surprisingly though, the development of narratives in the anti-corruption field faces a certain 
time lag compared to narration dynamics in the environmental realm. Still a great amount of 
story elements in our study focused on the ‘getting on board’ metaphor, whereas they tend to 
refer to commitment mostly in a prospective view. In contrast, in the environmental domain 
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narratives of different actors may have already shifted from ‘joining the club’ toward ‘com-
mitment’ (Haack et al., 2012). This potential time lag in the context of corruption vis-à-vis 
other CSR issues is further supported by the observation that the largest voluntary CSR initia-
tive worldwide, the UN Global Compact, has added an anti-corruption principle only four 
years after CSR issues on the natural environment, human rights and labor norms had been in 
place. Even more, the interviewed program manager at ACN as well as the president of the 
local Singapore Compact have highlighted that corruption has only recently been included in 
public CSR debates. 
The other way round, our findings on anti-corruption may contribute to recent studies on idea-
tional CSR dynamics by highlighting the significant role of interactions and collective actions 
not only between different types of actors but also between the same types of actors. While 
Haack et al. (2012) focused on the reciprocal creation of meaning between banks and NGOs, 
future research is needed to explore ideational dynamics between e.g. compliant and noncom-
pliant corporate actors, their mutual interests and reasoning involved. Such studies tend to 
suggest that the different use of narratives is mainly attributable to the type of actor, e.g. “the 
failure narrative was solely told by NGOs” (Haack et al., 2012, p. 827). In contrast, we sug-
gest that primarily the point of reference, e.g. geographic or firm-specific context, explains 
the use of a certain narrative. Rather than NGOs solely referring to non-achievement and pri-
vate actors referring to compliance, actors are flexible to incorporate different perspectives 
and refer to a specific point of view depending on the institutional context. This flexibility 
embodied in single actors to selectively apply a certain narrative dependent on the underlying 
context – together with the incorporation of dynamics over time – explains how actors can 
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Table 1: Overview of data 
Organization Type Organization Name Representative  Data Type 





Telephone interview, 3 Integrity Initia-
tive annual reports, Collective Action 
guide (with World Bank and others) 
Siemens, HQ Senior compliance 2 personal interviews, Telephone in-
terview, 5 Annual & Sustain. Reports, 
Compliance System publication 
Siemens, Philippines Senior sales Telephone interview 
Daimler, Greater China 
Ltd.  




Daimler, HQ 1 senior & 1 mid-
level compliance 
2 personal interviews 
Shell, Philippines Finance director Personal interview, presentation slides 
Companies 
SMART Technical Serv-
ices Co., Myanmar 
General manager Workshop presentation, presentation 
slides 
Singapore Compact (Local 
UNGC network) 
Senior Personal interview 
ASEAN CSR Network 
(ACN) 
2 program directors 3 personal interviews, publication 
Integrity Initiative, Philip-
pines  
1 from MBC & 1 
from ECCP 





Indonesian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, 
(KADIN BSD) 
Senior Personal interview, follow-up email 
correspondence 
Association of Southeast 




Personal interview Government 
CPIB, Singapore (Corrupt 
Practices Investigation 
Bureau) 
Former senior rep. Short conversation, workshop pres. 
UNODC (UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime), South-
east Asia and the Pacific 
Senior Personal interview, workshop pres. 
UNGC (Global Compact), 
Transparency & Anti-
Corruption 




Senior Several short conversations 
Transparency International 
(TI) Philippines 
Executive director Personal interview 
TI Malaysia 2 senior Personal interview 
IDEAS (Institute for De-





Personal interview, publication 
Thai Listed Companies 
Association 
President Personal interview 
TI Germany, Berlin Former rep. (Integ-
rity Pacts) 
Telephone interview, brochure 





Executive director 2 personal interviews 
Uni. of Nottingham, Ma-
laysia campus 
Professor Email correspondence Academia 
HTW Chur Professor Personal interview 
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Table 2: Sample quotes of selected narratives and story elements 
Narratives & 
Surface Stories 
Story elements Sample quotes 
Compliance despite non-achievement 
Complying with 
the rules 
“The public prosecutor’s office was investigating at our premises and, as a listed company at the New York Stock Ex-
change, of course the SEC as well. There was no choice.” (Siemens HQ, Switzerland) 
“[H]it by a lot of violation sanctions already, your controls have already matured to the point that you cannot afford any 
grey area in your policies.“ (ASEAN CSR Network (ACN)) 
Identifying clean 
business 
“Our intention is basically to identify good partners.“ (Siemens, ASEAN) 
“… we’ve hardly been, or not at all, into government entities. So mostly, the entities that we have been into … are 
mostly private firms, so it makes it easier for us (Siemens, Philippines) 
Substantive 
compliance 
Yes we can “We are a known brand. So yes, you could say it’s a market power, because Shell is a big player and we are known not 
to go into any under-the-table deals. (...) So, when we say no, they don’t insist. And we are still able to go through with 








“[W]e guys, we need to play fair, you local guys are not playing fair“ (ACN) 
“There are differences in the understanding of corruption and the tolerance level. … There are a sort of activities that 
are just - well - accepted.” (Daimler, Greater China, referring to China) 
“… at least the majority of European companies are doing their level best, on the same level. But you cannot say the 
same for the Koreans and the Japanese. We cannot see the same. (Siemens, ASEAN) 




„Do they think it is a bribe at all? … I think a lot of people will say, no, I don't give bribes, but I do look after my cli-
ents … And that's the question about how is it seen locally versus internationally.“ (TI, Malaysia) 
“How do you differentiate between professional activity and a personal activity?“ (Siemens, ASEAN)  
“Let's go into USA, America. It's very common that they get tips. If you want to have a nice dining table, you tip. If 
tips are a form of corruption, of petty corruption, how do you define that? … And what about the lobbyist system in 
America? … the difficulty that people have in actually uncovering who has given how much to which party when is 
symptomatic of the actual lack of transparency…“ (TI, Malaysia) 
“He [the government official] has not forced us down our throat. He was basically saying ‘please use … there is this 
partner, I recommend this person’. As long as he doesn’t put it to our head saying ‘if you don’t use him, you can’t do 
this’, I have no issues.“ (Siemens, ASEAN) 
 Managing per-
ception 
“It’s a game of perception. … certain governments are very good with containing such publicity and perception. They 
put in processes, they put in controls, but it doesn’t mean there are no bribery cases in Singapore.“ (Siemens, ASEAN) 
 Complying with “So you can work with the letter of the law, but leave out the spirit. So you can be 100% compliant, but no system is 
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the rules but vio-
lating the princi-
ples 
100% perfect. So you can deal with all the rules, and you can still bypass them at key points, and get what you want. 
And that is the difference between compliance and integrity.” (Business Integrity Programme Manager, TI Malaysia) 




“ … the agreement was [that] there is no ranking and in a way it also makes sense, because you cannot really compare 
apples and oranges, countries with very different backgrounds, … very different contexts.“ (UNODC, ASEAN) 
“I think at some circumstances because we are a big player because the problem with the smaller players is that ... if 
they say no now, there will be some repercussions later on, like things will be delayed or a permit will not be issued 






“It’s about the person who’s not earning so much and sees now someone’s giving me more. What would I do? I take 
that. So there’s so many different dimensions to it. Singapore government, basically, their administers are paid as much 
as a CEO of a company is paid.“ (Siemens, ASEAN) 
Getting others on 
board first 
“[O]ur first agenda is usually ... we get them on board, because once they do that ... then we have a clear framework to 
work with them. (...) to get them on board you need to use a system they are all open to.“ (UNODC, ASEAN) 






“Once they have actually ratified, they have obligations. (...) it also creates a momentum in countries to do it, because 
sometimes even the national authorities may want to do it, but they may not have the momentum or the support. ...“ 
(UNODC, ASEAN) 
“It’s the better approach actually (to) make people go back to their values, reflect on them ... It’s all ethical issues. 




“Some of these experiences and lessons learnt, … we also want to share with our JVs.“ (Daimler, Greater China) 
“I gave our contractors our hotline. I told them ‘if you think there is something you need to report, use this hotline or 
get in touch with your contract holder. … like I said earlier, be the example ...“ (Shell, Philippines) 





“In all areas there is a learning requirement. (…) the advanced companies, we are counting on these guys to really help 
us spread the word. (...) because of Siemens, we were able to access a resource that’s critical in fueling our efforts (In-
tegrity Initiative, Philippines) 
“He (Jericho Petilla, energy secretary, Philippines) says ‘we need the support from various sectors, in this case Sie-
mens’. And that I believe is one form of a vision also for a government to improve.” (Siemens, ASEAN) 
Leveling the 
playing field  
Uniting actors 
and their thinking 
“In this world, we are now 173 ships, (but) nowadays, we have to be one hundred and seventy three cabins in a big 
liner. And this is where we are working together. ... 173 countries moving around the ocean. We are really lost. (...) we 
can no longer become a ship, we are 173 cabins in one big ocean liner working together.” (TI, Malaysia) 
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 Finding common 
grounds 
‘It is like a flowerbed, where it is uncertain which bulbs will bear fruit’ (Siemens HQ, Collective Action) 
“This is where we come in. We try to expose the deal in such a way that it is a level playing field. That’s why we are 
important here.“ (Integrity Initiative, Philippines) 
“We engaged the department of finance in coming up with a tax regulation saying that in order to prevent smuggling, ... 
why don’t you impose tax on all products and then if the company is able to prove that they re-exported it, then they 
get a refund on their tax.” (Shell, Philippines) 
Progress as achievement 




“These [collective action] processes take a lot of time” (Siemens HQ, Collective Action) 
“You are going to take baby steps with this topic.“ (Siemens, Philippines) 
“Most of us want to see success overnight, but you would not get this success of fighting corruption overnight. It takes 
some time“. (TI, Malaysia) 
Bearing fruit “No, actually his administration is bearing fruit” (Integrity Initiative, Philippines, referring to president Aquino) 
„ ... from where it was 10 years ago to where it is [now], there is change.“ (Siemens, ASEAN) 
“[T]he global discourse has changed a lot in the past 20 years. Corruption has become an issue that is discussed glob-
ally. There is much more awareness about it. (...) it’s not a taboo that it used to be.“ (UNODC, ASEAN) 
Progressing 
step-by-step 
Small steps are 
large steps 
“These changes happen in very small cycles but they are considered big changes.“ (Siemens, ASEAN) 
Ongoing effort 
demanding con-
stant recalibration  
“It means that you have to continuously do things. It’s not only about the laws you have to pass. You have to have sys-
tems in place. You have to have prevention systems in place. You have to be implementing those laws. You need to 
have institutions, which are capable of implementing all these normative frameworks. They need to have the capacity 
to do that and so on. (...) And these reforms I think it’s very naïve to think that you can pass these laws, and you can 
have an anti-corruption agency and everything, and you solved the corruption problem.” (UNODC, ASEAN) 
“… the weakness is that people take advantages. Or, it is that they find more loopholes existing in law and regulation. 
So you come back to the square one.” (TI, Malaysia) 
“I think it is very difficult in the area of anti-corruption to say that ever about any country: ... you are perfectly imple-





“Now, what ... [we] want to do with the ASEAN CSR Network is to create a regional network gradually; first with 
countries which are ready, but then bring all of them. And that has two purposes. One is to create another level of 
commitment among companies from the region …, to bring them all on the same level with their compliance system, to 
help coordinate, help exchange. But on the other hand, I also hope that they could bring more pressure on their gov-
ernments, demanding actions from the government.“ (ACN) 
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Table 3: Three theoretical perspectives on decoupling 
 The classic view The instrumental view The integrative view 
Decoupling 
description 
Gap between policy and 
practice (symbolic 
adoption) 
Gap between means and 
ends (symbolic imple-
mentation) 
Gap as moving target 














ligible; logic of confi-
dence and good faith 
Transparency and ac-
countability trend 
Meaning of compliance 
and achievement is re-
ciprocally typified 
Actors Passively responsive Actively responsive Interactive 
Space Local (mono-spatial) Global Multi-spatial 
Time Formerly static, increas-
ingly dynamic 









Meyer & Rowan, 1977, 
Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 
2008 
Bromley & Powell, 
2012; Wijen, 2014 
Christensen, Morsing & 







Figure 1: Data structure 
Narrative Surface Story Story Elements Focus 
Insufficient anti-corruption processes HQ Noncompliance 
(Retrospect) 
Symbolic adop-
tion Lacking awareness and/or wrong 
mindset 
HQ 
Complying with the rules HQ 
Identifying clean business HQ 
Substantive 
compliance 
Yes we can HQ 




Persistence of corruption and intranspar-
ent business elsewhere 
Sub 
Ambiguity of what actually counts as 
corruption  
Global  
Managing perception Global 
Compliance despite 
non-achievement 
No level playing 
field 
Complying with the rules but violating 
the principles 
HQ 
Highlighting others’ particularities Sub Acknowledging 
heterogeneity Perspective-taking Sub 





Gaining momentum and conditioning 
people’s minds 
Sub 
Leading by example HQ Educating 
Willingness to learn Sub 
Uniting actors and their thinking Global 
Collective Action  
Leveling the 
playing field  Finding common grounds Global 
Allowing for time to progress (highlight-
ing dynamics) 
Global 
Bearing fruit Global 
Progressing 
step-by-step 
Small steps are large steps Global 











Figure 2: Coupling process model – From noncompliance to achievement 
 
 
